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Abstract 
We analyze whether the introduction of the bail-in tool in January 2016 affected the pricing of Italian 
bank bonds.  Using a unique dataset of 1,798 fixed-rate bonds issued during the period 2013–2016, we 
find an increase of the spread at issuance of bail-inable bonds compared to non-bail-inable bonds. This 
increase also depends on the intrinsic characteristics of each bank. Large institutions, banks with lower 
ratings, profitability, capitalization, and higher liquidity faced a higher cost of issuing bail-inable 
bonds. Overall, our results seem to support the hypothesis of an improved market discipline for the 
bank bonds primary market. 
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Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis a decade ago, many European Governments were forced 
to intervene through capital injections and purchase of toxic assets in order to support their troubled 
banks (Ammann et al., 2017) and, consequently, avoid financial contagion within closely 
interconnected banking systems (Deutsche Bank, 2014). Bank resolutions were costly, indeed, during 
the 2008-2012 period, with public interventions amounting to roughly 600 billion euros (excluding 
guarantee schemes), that is 4.6% of the European GDP in 2012 (Benczur et al., 2017). More 
importantly, because taxpayers’ money was used to manage the crisis of (mostly private) banks, public 
bailouts resulted unsustainable from both a financial and a political perspective. 
In addition, the expectation of assistance via publicly funded bailouts amplifies moral hazard 
behavior, leading to excessive risk-taking in particular for large institutions (Hüser et al., 2017; Pais 
and Stork, 2013; Zhao, 2018). Large banks benefit of an implicit public guarantee, as they are 
supposed to be more likely bailed out than smaller institutions (i.e., they are “too-big-to-fail”). This 
ultimately represents an important market distortion as it allows large banks to raise funding at 
cheaper rates (Ueda and Weder Di Mauro, 2013). 
As recognized even by some supervisors, excessive risk-taking behavior by banks was, among 
other reasons, the result of the lack of an effective resolution mechanism.1 Therefore, motivated by the 
need to reduce the costs of bank resolutions, especially those borne by taxpayers, and in order to 
improve market discipline, the Parliament and the Council of the European Union approved in 2014 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). Effective since January 2016, the new 
regulatory framework for recovery and resolution of banks gives supervisors a set of instruments to 
intervene at early stage to prevent situations of bank distress, thus to ensure the business continuity 
and to reduce the impact on the functioning of the financial system. Nevertheless, the Directive 
requires that, in case of irreversible disruption of a bank, in order to restore its viability equity holders 
should bear losses first and subsequently unsecured creditors in a predefined hierarchy, while leaving 
its secured liabilities intact. This could potentially lead unsecured debtholders see their investment 
                                               
1 According to Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB: “Excessive risk-taking by banks is at 
the origin of the financial crisis. One of the many factors contributing to their risk-taking behaviour was the 
distorted incentive structure resulting from the lack of an effective resolution mechanism” (Cœuré, 2013, 
emphasis added). 
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written off or converted into equity (for more details see, among others, Chennells and Wingfield, 
2015).2 
The introduction of the BRRD Directive not only can affect banks risk-taking propensity and 
stability, but it can also have an impact on the bank funding costs because the bail-in rules transfer risk 
from taxpayers to unsecured bondholders.3 Because of this increased risk, holders of bail-inable 
liabilities may be expected to ask, ceteris paribus, for higher returns compared to holders of liabilities 
that are excluded from the bail-in mechanism. Market discipline (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996, Bliss 
and Flannery, 2002) would predict that the cost of funding for such liabilities would reflect more 
accurately their actual risks. However, whether investors will ask for a higher risk premium on bank 
bonds at origination is ultimately an empirical question, which depends on whether they consider the 
implementation of the BRRD a plausible threat for their savings. 
We believe that Italy is an interesting laboratory for testing the effect of the new bail-in rules on 
bank funding costs for several reasons. First, Italian banks are quite dependent on bonds as a form of 
funding compared to banks in other European countries (Coletta and Santioni, 2016). In addition, the 
portion of bank bonds in Italian retail investor’s portfolios is rather greater than the average of 
developed countries (Coletta and Santioni, 2016; Grasso et al., 2010).  
Second, Italian banks place most of their bonds (around 80%) directly to their customers over the 
counter (Gentile and Siciliano, 2009; Coletta and Santioni, 2016), thus avoiding the costs associated to 
the listing of these securities and, more importantly, this gives rise to an obvious conflict of interest. 
As a consequence, unsophisticated retail investors are the main holders of the banks debt securities 
(Grasso et al., 2010). Italian banks have benefited from their placing power, which allowed them to 
raise funding via bonds issuances quite cheaply. In fact, Del Giudice (2017) finds that bank bonds 
were issued at a negative spread (compared to risk free securities) prior to the entry into force of the 
MiFID I regulation. Interestingly, the same author observes that bank bond spreads turn positive as the 
MiFID I increases the competitions among banks and trading venues. 
                                               
2 In this paper we refer to unsecured liabilities – the target of a potential bail-in enforcement – as the bail-inable 
debt. In contrast, secured liabilities represent the non-bail-inable debt (see, for instance, Philippon and Salord, 
2017). 
3 Please note that, although the “bail-in” is only one of the four resolution tools introduced with the BRRD, in 
this paper we will often refer to the “bail-in regime” in a broader sense (i.e., not strictly meaning the resolution 
tool) just to emphasise the change from the previous bail-out framework. 
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Third, the National Resolution Authority (i.e., the Bank of Italy) applied a quasi bail-in to 4 small 
banks (Banca delle Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, Cassa di Risparmio della 
Provincia di Chieti, and Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara) in November 2015, a few weeks before the 
official implementation of the bail-in resolution tool.4 Notably, although those 4 regionally chartered 
banks accounted for less than 2% of the Italian banking market, the news of their quasi bail-in became 
the hot topic in the news for a while, which could have enhanced investors’ awareness about the 
negative consequences of bail-ins on their savings and investments. In addition, a vast information 
campaign was properly carried out by the banks in Italy. Indeed, the Italian stock market regulator 
(CONSOB) late in November 2015 required all the intermediaries to appropriately inform investors 
about the consequences of the implementation of the BRRD.5 A survey conducted by the Italian 
Bankers’ Association (Associazione Bancaria Italiana, ABI) in January 2016 also reveals that several 
initiatives were adopted to massively inform customers about the switch to the new bail-in regime via, 
for instance, specific leaflet enclosed to the monthly/quarterly bank’s statements, as well as through 
fliers handed out at the banks’ branches.6  
Furthermore, although Italian investors are often blamed of lacking adequate financial literacy (see, 
among others, Bartirolo, 2011), a study by Accornero and Moscatelli (2018) reveals that at least 
recently the information regarding the banks’ fundamentals, such as the Tier 1 capital ratio, influences 
Italian households’ decisions. Similarly, Boccuzzi and De Lisa (2017) document that market discipline 
was properly working in Italy around the time the BRRD became effective. Overall, this leads us 
reasonably think that Italian investors improved their awareness about the potential negative effects 
arising from funding unhealthy banks. 
Interestingly, the BRRD introduction might hit the banks with a different intensity depending on 
their intrinsic characteristics. Indeed, for those banks that in the pre-BRRD era would have benefited 
the most from an implicit guarantee, we should observe a greater impact of the new bail-in rules. 
Notably, bank specific characteristics should influence their bond funding costs with different 
                                               
4 Precisely, on November 16th 2015 the Italian Government published the Law 180/2015 that aimed to apply a 
burden sharing approach to four small regionally chartered banks. 
5  The Communication No. 00904030 is available at the following link: 
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/c0090430.pdf/09b990c7-1e84-486c-bc24-9875e68e63cd  
6 See in this regard: https://www.abi.it/Pagine/news/Iniziative-informative-in-tema-di-bail-in.aspx  
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intensity in the pre- and post- bail-in phases. To the extent that the bail-in tools is valued as a credible 
mechanism by the market, riskier institutions will be the ones who will experience a higher cost of 
funding after the introduction of the new rules, as well as large banks that should no longer benefit 
from any implicit public guarantee.  
At present, the existing literature mainly focuses on the effect of the new regulatory framework on 
bank specific risk and financial stability. For example, using an event-study methodology, Schäfer et 
al. (2016) analyze the reactions of CDS spreads and share prices related to European banks after the 
announcement of some operations in which investors suffered a total or partial bail-in. The authors 
find evidence of a significant increase in CDS spreads and a reduction of share prices. More 
pronounced reactions take place in those countries where the weaknesses of public finances make it 
more difficult for them to implement the bailout of a large bank. Moreover, the authors emphasize that 
it is the actual occurrence of a bail-in, rather than the simple introduction of a new legislation, that 
produces a concrete reaction. In a similar fashion, Mikosek (2016) investigates the CDS spreads of 20 
banks from six European countries, and compares them to the CDS spreads of the corresponding 
domestic Governments. Starting from 2015, the ratio of the average bank CDS spreads over sovereign 
CDS increases substantially, showing a sharp misalignment between sovereign and bank risk 
perceptions. This phenomenon demonstrates that the players of this specific market (CDS market) 
start at one point to discount the fact that Governments will not rescue banks anymore. As regards the 
secondary bond market, a recent study from Giuliana (2018) using a difference-in-difference approach 
finds that bail-in events amplified the difference in daily yield between bail-inable (non-secured) and 
non-bail-inable (secured) bonds. These findings support the notion that the authorities’ efforts to 
introduce the bail-in regime increased the bail-in expectations in the secondary market. Moreover, 
Giuliana (2018) provides evidence that the bail-in events reinforced the relationship between a bank’s 
default probability and the price of its securities.  
Similar to Giuliana (2018), we investigate the effectiveness of the new banking regulation by 
comparing the pricing reaction of unsecured and secured bonds. Indeed, as pointed out by Chan-Lau 
and Oura (2016), the bail-in increases the cost difference between bail-inable and non-bail-inable 
bonds.  
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However, a distinct feature of our paper is that we focus on the Italian bond primary market. 
Notably, we contribute to the literature by measuring the impact of the BRRD introduction on the 
bank cost of issuing bonds. Indeed, the majority (80%) of bonds issued by Italian banks are not 
publicly listed. Hence, by focusing on the secondary market we would be disregarding a substantial 
share of the market. Additionally, we would not be able to offer evidence of the actual cost of funding 
borne by the banks which, instead, is observable from the primary market (inter alia, Sironi, 2003; 
Zaghini, 2014; Chan-Lau and Oura, 2016). To this extent, our research work aims to provide further 
evidence on the credibility of the bail-in mechanism, which adds to current findings from the 
secondary market. 
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature analyzing market discipline as a regulatory tool 
(see, among others, Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Calomiris, 1999; Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 
2002; Hellwig, 2005). As Bliss and Flannery (2002) highlight, market discipline consists of two 
distinct components: i) monitoring, which refers to how market prices reflect the financial condition of 
a single bank, and ii) influence which, instead, describes how such market information affects the 
incentives for managers to engage in risk-taking behavior. Because we analyze whether the riskiness 
of banks has an impact on their cost of issuing bonds pre- and post-BRRD, our work relates to the first 
category in this classification. Some studies in this field of the literature show that bondholders are 
quite sensitive to bank specific risks (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Jagtiani et al., 1999; Covitz et al., 
2000; DeYoung et al., 2001; Hancock and Kwast, 2001). With respect to the European market, Sironi 
(2003) analyzes the primary market spread of a sample of subordinate bonds issued by European 
banks in the period 1991-2000. The results of this study show that investors properly price the specific 
risk factors of each issuer, and that in the second half of ‘90s the TBTF effect tends to disappear. More 
recently, Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) pointed out that, in the USA, the hypothesis to reintroduce 
a government guarantee for large banks, after the default of the “LTCM” hedge fund, reduced the 
sensitivity of the spread to bank specific characteristics. Similar conclusions were reached by Santos 
(2014) who shows the existence of a TBTF effect both in the banking as well as in the non-financial 
sectors, as large non-financial corporations also enjoyed the advantages due to their size. Yet, the 
TBTF effect is quite stronger for large banks, suggesting that investors believe that the probability of a 
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bailout for these intermediaries in time of crisis is very high. A more recent analysis by Acharya et al. 
(2016) indicates the presence of a TBTF effect in showing that the bond spreads of small and medium 
banks are more risk-specific related, while this characteristic tends to disappear for bonds issued by 
large banks. 
Using a sample of 1,798 fixed-rate senior bonds issued by 28 Italian banks from January 2013 to 
December 2016, we first document an increase of bond funding cost in 2016 upon the adoption of the 
BRRD. Precisely, the average spread (i.e., difference between the yield to maturity at issuance offered 
by the bank bonds and the yield offered by government bonds with corresponding maturities) followed 
an interesting path during the observed period, going from 0.56% in the pre bail-in period (2013-2015) 
to 0.70% for bonds issued after 2016. Notably, the difference between the average spreads in the two 
sub-periods appears to be statistically significant. 
Our regression analysis confirms that, even when we account for bond and bank characteristics as 
well as bank fixed effects and bank-time fixed effects, banks faced a higher cost when issuing bail-
inable bonds compared to bonds not subject to the new regulation. 
Consistent with the existing literature, we find that banks characterized by lower ratings, 
profitability, capitalization, and higher liquidity were forced to pay higher spreads to place their bonds 
with the new bail-in regime. In addition, we observe that large banks (and especially the largest ones) 
were able to pay a lower spread until 2015. In contrast, after 2015 they face, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the cost of funding. Eventually, the implementation of the new Directive might have 
mitigated the too-big-too-fail effect, which is consistent with the findings of, among others, Zaghini 
(2014).  
Moreover, following Schäfer et al. (2016), we show that the implementation of the quasi bail-in 
just some weeks before the effective entry into force of the BRRD contributed to lead retail investors 
demanding a higher premium for their investment in bank bonds. 
We confirm the robustness of our results by conducting several additional analyses. To mitigate the 
concern that the rise in the spread in the primary market is a consequence of a generalized increase of 
banks’ risk, rather than a result of the BRRD approval, we carry out the following robustness tests. 
First, following Schäfer et al. (2016) and Giuliana (2018), we show that the spread between bail-inable 
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and non-bail-inable bonds reacts also to events that do not produce a significant increase in banks’ 
risk, such as when the EU Legislative Bodies voted the resolution to adopt uniform rules for the 
resolution of banks in April 2014. Second, we exclude from our analysis those banks that, during the 
observed period, faced serious undercapitalization problems or were subject to any public 
interventions, and we show that our main findings are not driven by their inclusion in our sample. 
Additionally, because the non-bail-inable bonds were issued by a limited number of intermediaries, 
we run our regressions on a sub-sample of banks that excludes those that did not issue any non-bail-
inable bond, and demonstrate that our results remain consistent. Furthermore, because two banks 
issued almost one third of the bonds in our sample, we run again our models on a sub-sample that 
excludes them in order to rule out the possibility that the observed increase in the spread is driven by 
those banks’ intrinsic characteristics rather than be representing an overall consequence of the BRRD 
implementation. Results from this sub-sample corroborate again our hypothesis about the existence of 
a regulation effect. Finally, we show the robustness of our findings even when we employ different 
proxies of the bank characteristics. 
Overall, our analysis offers interesting policy implications because, as prescribed by the new 
legislation, Authorities should also count on market discipline to improve their prudential supervision. 
Higher risk sensitivity, indeed, is especially needed in countries like Italy where, historically, market 
discipline has not been working properly. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next Section summarizes the relevant 
features of the new regulatory framework. Section 3 describes our data and provides a discussion of 
key summary statistics, and the empirical research methods we employ in this study. Results are 
presented in Section 4, while additional analyses are offered in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Regulatory framework 
Motivated by the need of designing a common toolkit for banks resolutions across the globe, as well 
as addressing the too-big-to-fail issue – thus to prevent new bailouts at taxpayers’ expenses – the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) set a framework of rules aimed at ensuring ordered resolutions of 
banks and limiting the use of state coffers. These principles were transposed in the European 
 10 
Legislation via the adoption, in May 2014, of the so-called BRRD. The most known resolution tool 
introduced by the European Directive is the “bail-in” (as opposed to bailout), which was made 
available at each EU member states Resolution Authority since January 2016.7 In essence, under given 
circumstances, the National Resolution Authority (or the Single Resolution Board, under its power 
over the national Bodies) is allowed to impose the losses of a failing bank to its owners and creditors, 
according to a pre-defined hierarchy. Specifically, loss absorption via “bail-in” is achieved by first 
writing down Common equity TIER 1, then Additional TIER 1 capital, TIER 2 capital, all other 
Subordinated Liabilities, all other Senior Unsecured Liabilities, and finally eligible deposits over 
100,000 Euro. Notably, the bail-in tool may be applied to recapitalize an institution, as well as to 
convert to equity or reduce the principal amount of claims that are transferred either to a “bridge 
institution”, or under the “sale of business” or “asset separation” tools (BRRD, Art. 43). This should 
enable a fairer resolution process of the banks, by excluding (or at least limiting) the injection of 
taxpayers’ money. Furthermore, some liabilities are explicitly excluded from the bail-in scope, such as 
covered deposits, secured bonds, liabilities to other financial institutions with an original maturity of 
less than seven days, employee remuneration, liabilities to commercial or trade creditors relating to the 
provision of critical goods or services, liabilities to tax and social security authorities that are preferred 
by law, liabilities for contributions to deposit guarantee schemes.8 These exclusions would, de facto, 
make the excluded claims senior to bail-inable debt. 
Overall, by designing the bail-in tool, the policy maker aimed at increasing the incentive, for 
creditors, to monitor the health of banks during normal times, thus limiting the occurrence of new 
bank failures.9 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
To select our sample of bonds, we start out with all the banks in the Thomson Reuters Eikon database 
that issued fixed-rate bonds from January 2013 to December 2016. We further rely on the following 
                                               
7 Apart from the bail-in, the BRRD toolkit also includes: sale of business, bridge bank, and asset separation. See 
also: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/tasks-tools  
8 More information can be found here: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa  
9  In this regard, see recital No. 67 of the BRRD: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN  
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criteria and select: i) banks that issued fixed-rate bonds both before and after the introduction of the 
BRRD in order to avoid potential issues related to sample selection that can bias our main results; ii) 
banks that are deposit-taking and loan-making institutions (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012),10 and iii) banks 
with at least one bond issuance for every given year in the sample period. All in all, these criteria lead 
us to a final sample of 28 banks (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of the sampled banks).11 For 
each selected bank, we then supplement our sample of bonds by manually searching, in each bank’s 
website, potential bond issuances – especially non-listed ones – that are missing from the Thomson 
Reuters Eikon database. 
Data concerning the characteristics of the bonds are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon or 
hand-collected directly from the final terms of each issuance when they are not available. Following 
Sironi (2003), we collect data regarding the coupon offered by fixed-rate bonds, the frequency of 
coupon payment, the size of the issuance, the maturity, and the listing venue, if any. Consistent with 
previous literature (e.g., Sironi, 2003; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; Iannotta, 2011; Iannotta et al., 2013a), 
we exclude perpetual bonds, while we include bonds denominated in euro, with no optional 
component (e.g., call or put option). Overall, this selecting procedure leads us to a unique dataset of 
1,798 bonds issued by a sample of 28 Italian banks during the period January 2013 – December 2016. 
Table A1 in the Appendix also shows the bonds distribution, by bank. 
Notably, our sample only includes senior bonds in the fixed interest category (fixed coupon or zero 
coupon). This choice is motivated by several reasons. First, as pointed by Santos (2014), “unique” 
features of bonds such as floating-rates and call option can affect bonds pricing. Second, non-
structured senior bonds are the most common type of bonds in Italian households’ portfolios (Coletta 
and Santioni, 2016) and, more importantly, this allows us to measure the yield to maturity at issuance, 
which ultimately represents the effective cost of funding borne by the banks. Since our goal is to study 
the impact that the adoption of the BRRD has generated on the cost of funding borne by the banks 
when issuing bonds, we refer exclusively to the returns offered in the primary market – following the 
                                               
10 As in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) we require a deposit to assets ratio above 20% and a loan to assets ratio above 
10%. 
11 Because bank holding companies operate internal capital markets, shocks to one part of the organization are 
likely to be transmitted to other subsidiaries (Houston et al., 1997). We therefore use the BHC’s information to 
summarize the condition of all its subsidiary lenders. We link each relationship lender’s information with its 
ultimate BHC parent. 
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approach used, among others, by Morgan and Stiroh (2001), and Sironi (2003). Indeed, as pointed out 
by Zaghini (2014), the fluctuations of the returns observed in the secondary market do not influence 
the cost of funding for the issuing banks. Moreover, for many securities included in our sample, the 
secondary market is inexistent. Indeed, 80% of the bonds in our dataset are not publicly traded in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF (multilateral trading facility). In any case, because our aim is to 
investigate the effect of regulation on the bond funding costs, this would be precluded when analyzing 
the secondary market. 
It must be noticed, as well, that the yield to maturity at issuance is not available in Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. Therefore, we hand-collected this information from the final terms of each bond 
issuance. The yield to maturity at issuance is then compared to the yield offered by Italian sovereign 
bonds with similar maturity in order to construct our variable of interest, which is the ‘Spread’.12 
A first summary of the data shows that the average number of issuances, per year, is slightly 
greater than 520 during the first three years of the investigated period, with a peak of 610 and 608 in 
2013 and 2014, respectively. In 2016, conversely, the issuances fall to 212, of which 70% in the first 
semester of the year. This decrease is probably due to the expansionary monetary policies adopted by 
the ECB (Bufacchi, 2017), which reduced the necessity of funding from retail investors. 
In the first months of the observed period the Spread takes negative values, reaching a minimum of 
–3,13%, as reported in Panel A of Table 1. This appears to contradict theoretical assumptions 
according to which sovereign bonds should be considered risk free by domestic investors, or at least as 
a basis rate to price non-sovereign bonds. Yet this phenomenon, well known by practitioners, is not 
new also to academics: even if on the basis of different samples and periods, other researchers have 
indeed indicated the presence of negative spreads in the Italian bank bonds market (inter alia, Grasso 
et al., 2010; Del Giudice, 2017). As mentioned above, the motivation could lie in the commercial 
skills of the bank salesforces and the bank placing power (Del Giudice, 2017). The variable Spread 
also shows a wide dispersion over the sample period; this could be due to bank and bond specific 
                                               
12 We use the Rendistato – as a proxy of the Italian sovereign bond yield –, which is an average return of 
sovereign bonds computed for a variety of maturities and published each month by the Bank of Italy. See: 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/operazioni-mef/rendistato-rendiob 
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characteristics; therefore, we explore how those variables are related to each other by employing a 
multivariate set-up in Section 4. 
In Panel A of Table 1 we also report the descriptive statistics – for the entire period – of the 
variables related to the characteristics of each bond (BOND VAR) utilized in our analysis. In contrast, 
in Panel B we report a snapshot of the summary statistics of the same variables in two distinct sub-
periods, namely pre bail-in (2013–2015) and post bail-in adoption (2016). 
 
– TABLE 1 HERE – 
 
The average spread for the entire period is 0.58%. However, as reported in Panel B of Table 1, the 
analysis of the two sub periods reveals that, prior to the switch to the bail-in regime, the average 
spread was 0.56%, while after January 2016 the average spread increased of about 14 basis points 
reaching the value of 0.70%. This is not a minor increase if we think that it represents a surge of about 
25% in the interest rates spreads from the bailout era to the new bail-in regime.13 
Concerning the other BOND VAR, we note that the average maturity for the entire sample is less 
than 4 years, the average amount issued is Euro 53,74 million, and less than 20% of the bonds is listed 
in a regulated stock exchange or MTF. We do not observe any significant change of the main bond 
characteristics when comparing the pre- and post- 2016 period, as the mean values of such BOND 
VARs in the two sub-periods are not statistically different. 
To ascertain whether the introduction of the BRRD increases bank bonds cost of funding, we 
estimate a regression model that includes: i) a dummy, labelled “Post2016”, which equals one when a 
bond was issued after 1st January 2016 and zero otherwise, ii) a dummy, labelled “Non_Bailinable”, 
which equals one when a bond is either secured, senior secured, or asset backed, and zero otherwise 
(i.e., senior unsecured, unsecured), as well as iii) an interaction term between Post2016 and 
Non_Bailinable dummies. Particularly, this interaction is essential for us to test the differential impact 
of the new bail-in regime on investors in bail-inable bonds and non-bail-inable securities, which are de 
facto excluded from the bail-in scope. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model 
                                               
13 Please note that the means from the two sub-samples are statistically different (unreported t-tests). 
 14 
 
!"#$%&',) = +, + +./0122016 + +7809_;%<=<9%>=$',) + +?/0122016x809_;%<=<9%>=$',) +
+A;B8C	EFG',) + +H;F8I	EFG)J. + +KLMNO	PO + +Q;F8I	PO +	$' (1) 
 
where: 
BOND VAR is a vector of bond characteristics, which includes the following variables: 
• Maturity = the time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date (as in Iannotta et al., 
2013a); 
• Size = the log of the amount issued (as in Iannotta and Navone, 2008); 
• Listed = a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a regulated stock exchange or MTF; 
• Step-up = a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-up structure. 
 
BANK VAR is a vector of lagged variables14 related to the bank characteristics extracted from the 
Bureau van Dijk “Orbis–Bank Focus” database, which includes the following: 
• Bank Rating = a variable that, following the rating scale provided by Iannotta et al. (2013b), 
associates numerical values to the mean of the ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, 
and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk;  
• Bank Size = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
• TBTF (TBTF2) = a dummy that equals one if the total assets of the issuing bank are higher than 
the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year; 
• Tier 1 ratio = ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets; 
• ROAA = return on average assets (computed by Orbis as net income divided by the average of 
total assets at the beginning and at the end of the period); 
• Liquid Assets ratio = ratio of liquid assets and the sum of customer deposits and short-term 
funding (measured by Orbis); 
                                               
14 We utilize banks’ balance sheets data related to the year preceding the issuance of the bond as that is the most 
recent public information available, to investors, at the issuing date (as in Zaghini, 2014). In other words, the 
data from banks’ statements in year t–1 is utilized to generate our BANK VAR(s) that are matched to the BOND 
VAR(s) related to bonds issued in year t. 
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• NPL ratio = ratio of non-performing loans and the total amount of outstanding credits 
(measured by Orbis). 
TIME FE are year dummies that we add to control for changing market conditions that could 
influence the value of the spread. 
BANK FE are bank fixed effects that we include in order to control for unobservable, time-
invariant, bank characteristics that might influence the bond yields. Additionally, in one of our 
specifications, we replace TIME FE and BANK FE with BANK*TIME fixed effect, which allows 
controlling for time-varying bank unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level. 
 
We expect +1 to be positive as investors should ask for a higher risk premium upon the entry into 
force of the BRRD. In contrast, +2 should exhibit a negative sign provided that non-bail-inable 
securities, on average, would offer lower returns than bail-inable ones, due to their lower riskiness. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, +3, should also be negative, as we expect holders of bail-inable 
securities to ask for a higher risk premium, compared to non-bail-inable debtholders, once they realize 
that their investments are potentially at risk due to the implementation of the new bail-in regime. 
The second regression model adds the interactions between bank characteristics and the 
“Post2016” dummy, thus to investigate if significant differences in investors’ reaction, due to the bank 
characteristics, emerge after the BRRD became effective. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
!"#$%&',) = +, + +./0122016 + +7809_;%<=<9%>=$',) + +?/0122016x809_;%<=<9%>=$',) +
+A;B8C	EFG',) + +H;F8I	EFG)J. + +K/0122016x;F8I	EFG)J. + +QLMNO	PO +
+R;F8I	PO + $'  (2) 
 
As regards the bond features, we expect the size of the issuance to be negatively correlated with the 
Spread. Indeed, by issuing larger amounts of bonds, banks can benefit of a decrease in the cost of 
funding due to better economies of scale. In addition, greater issues are usually offered by larger banks 
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that can more easily target a broader share of least bargaining retail investors, given their wider 
distribution network (Sironi, 2003). The maturity, at least theoretically, should be positively correlated 
with our dependent variable, as higher yields should be offered to bonds with longer redemption 
horizons (Zaghini, 2014). Furthermore, we expect listed bonds to be cheaper for banks with respect to 
non-listed ones because the access to capital markets should guarantee a liquid investment to the 
investor. However, we are conscious that investors may not price the liquidity premium because of the 
low level of banks transparency. Similarly, step-up securities could be overall cheaper for banks, as 
investors might not be completely able to fairly price such kind of securities because of the appealing 
structure of their increasing coupons. 
Moving to the bank characteristics, we expect that investors demand greater returns from bonds 
issued by riskier banks. For this reason, the variable “Bank Rating” – that takes, by construction, 
greater values when the creditworthiness is lower – should be positively correlated to our dependent 
variable, thus implying an increase in the cost of funding. In contrast, we expect Bank Size to reduce 
the spread, given that large banks should benefit from the implicit guarantee of the TBTF 
phenomenon, but also because they should be able to better diversify their business and have a more 
skilled management (Sironi, 2003; Ueda and Weder Di Mauro, 2013; Santos, 2014). Tier 1 ratio 
should have a negative effect on spreads, because more capitalized banks normally enjoy a good 
reputation in the market and can raise money at a lower rate of return. Nevertheless, Herring (2010) 
shows that those banks that required a government intervention during the financial crisis had, on 
average, more regulatory capital than those not requiring it. It would follow that regulatory capital is 
not always an efficient regulatory tool. With respect to the issuer’s profitability, as measured through 
ROAA, we expect it to exert a negative impact on spreads, considering that a greater profitability 
should signal a greater efficiency (Sironi, 2003). Alternatively, a higher ROAA could also reflect a 
greater risk-propensity by banks; in such a case, we should find a positive correlation with the spread 
(Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). The effect of the liquid assets ratio can be either negative or positive. 
Indeed, from one hand, bank liquidity can have a positive impact on bank solvency. On the other hand, 
greater values of the liquid assets ratio can be perceived as a sign of inefficiency in the management of 
the liquidity or, alternatively, they could inspire managers to take on more risk (Myers and Rajan, 
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1998), and increase conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Lastly, it 
is reasonable to expect that a greater exposure to impaired loans (as measured by the Non-Performing 
Loans (NPL) ratio) increases the spread at issuance because of a greater credit risk exposure and a 
higher uncertainty about future performances (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). 
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics of the abovementioned variables. Notably, we observe that the 
average amount of impaired loans over total loans is about 15%, with a maximum value of 36%. The 
average Tier 1 ratio is a little greater than 11% across the whole period, while the mean of the liquid 
assets ratio is 12.5%. Moreover, it is worth noting the poor profitability of the banks, as measured by 
the ROAA, during the observed period. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the correlation matrix 
related to the regressors employed in our analyses, which reveals that multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be a concern. 
 
– TABLE 2 HERE – 
 
4. Results 
The estimates of our regression model (1) are reported in Table 3. The first test – reported in Column 
1 – is carried out on a simplified version of model (1) where we do not include the interaction term 
between ‘Post2016’ and the ‘Non-bailinable’ dummies. Such an interaction is then included from 
Column 2 onwards. In columns 3–5 we add bank fixed effects. Additionally, from Column 4 we add a 
control variable for the bank riskiness. Whereas, in Columns 5 to 7 we include alternative measures of 
the bank size to check its effect on the spread at issuance. Finally, in Column 8 we report a test 
conducted by adding bank-year fixed effects. 
Overall, results confirm our earlier evidence from the univariate analysis. Indeed, the dummy 
‘Post2016’ is positively and highly significantly (at the 1% level) correlated with the Spread 
suggesting that, after the introduction of the bail-in framework, issuing bonds became costlier for 
Italian banks. As expected, the ‘Non-bailinable’ dummy has a negative and statistically significantly 
coefficient (at the 1% level) in all the specifications, thus corroborating our predictions that non-bail-
inable bonds carry lower yields due to their intrinsic lower level of riskiness – as being explicitly 
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excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool. Starting from Column 2, we then introduce the interaction 
term between ‘Post2016’ and the ‘Non-bailinable’ dummies. Its coefficient consistently exhibits a 
negative and significant sign across the various model specifications and is also robust to the inclusion 
of bank fixed effect and bank-year fixed effects in Columns 3-5 and 8, respectively. Overall, this 
finding confirms our expectations that, upon the introduction of the BRRD, investors ask for a higher 
return compared to non-bail-inable bonds. Although we cannot completely rule out any alternative 
explanations, results from Table 3 seem to provide evidence of an improved market discipline. 
 
– TABLE 3 HERE – 
 
Among the bond characteristics, we observe that the spread is negatively correlated with Size, 
which could be explained by the economies of scale and the liquidity that the bank gains when placing 
larger issuances. Indeed, the greater the amount issued, the lower the return that needs to be offered to 
the potential bondholder. This could also be explained by the fact that only larger banks and better 
capitalized ones are usually involved in big issuances (Zaghini, 2014). This alternative explanation 
seems to be supported by the fact that the coefficient is no longer significant once we control for bank-
fixed effects. Consistent with Rokkanen (2009) and Grasso et al. (2010), Maturity has a negative and 
significant coefficient. This result, apparently surprising, might be due to the significant concentration 
(85%) of short-medium term issuances (3-5 years) in our sample. Therefore, we repeat the analysis 
using different measures of Maturity (untabulated results), but the results do not change 
considerably.15 An alternative hypothesis is that banks that are more creditworthy find it easier to issue 
longer-term bonds (Zaghini, 2014). Surprisingly, the dummy Listed enters with a positive sign, 
suggesting that bonds that are traded on stock exchanges are costlier than bond traded OTC (over the 
counter). This result appears contradictory from a theoretical perspective, because listed bonds should 
be more liquid for investors. However, this coefficient is no longer statistically significant once we 
control for bank heterogeneity in Columns 3–5 and 8. Finally, Step-up bonds show a lower return at 
                                               
15 In particular, we used three dummies for bonds with a maturity lower than 3 years, from 3 to 5 years, and 
more than 5 years. 
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the issuing date; it is indeed possible that investors accept a lower spread because they are influenced 
by the promise of an increasing coupon. 
Moving to Column 4, we test the effect of BANK VAR on the spread for the entire sample period. 
Consistently with previous literature, we find that Bank Rating has a negative influence on the spread 
at launch: that is, the lower the issuer’s rating the higher the return granted to investors and thus the 
cost of funding. 
Further evidence about the issuer’s characteristics arises from Columns 5–7, where we focus on the 
importance of the bank size (Bank Size, TBTF and TBTF2) for the spread at issuance. The results show 
that all the three variables enter with negative signs, supporting the idea that investors expect that large 
banks enjoy an implicit TBTF guarantee (Anginer and Warburton, 2014; Santos, 2014). 
 
– TABLE 4 HERE – 
 
Interesting results also emerge from our regression model (2) whose estimates are reported in Table 
4. Column 1 shows the effects of bank specific factors on the spread. Consistently with our 
expectations, banks characterized by better ratings, larger size, and a lower level of non-performing 
loans, are able to issue bonds at lower spread. Higher Tier 1 ratio does not seem to be a selective 
factor for investors over the whole sample period. This evidence is line with some literature which 
points out that book equity measures do not capture the banks’ true ability to absorb losses (see 
Flannery and Giacomini, 2015). 
In Columns 2 to 7, we introduce the interaction terms between the bank risk specific variables and 
the dummy ‘Post2016’, which allows us to investigate the effectiveness of the new legislation in 
increasing the awareness, among investors, of the greater risks they might face in case a resolution 
action is undertaken against the bond issuers. The results of our analysis are indeed consistent with a 
higher risk-sensitivity of the spread at issuance after the implementation of the BRRD. Notably, we 
observe that since 2016 the majority of the bank variables report statistically significant coefficients, 
thus confirming that the information regarding the banks’ fundamentals incrementally influences 
investors’ decisions. Specifically, banks characterized by lower ratings, and lower profitability, were 
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forced to increase the returns of their bonds in comparison to the pre 2016 period. Interestingly, the 
interaction of Bank Size with ‘Post2016’ highlights that, following the entry into force of the BDDR, 
large banks issued bonds ensuring, on average, higher spreads (see also Zaghini, 2014; Acharya et al., 
2016) as the market figures out that the hypothesis of a public implicit guarantee is no longer reliable 
(Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).16 Furthermore, we find that banks with a lower Tier 1 ratio were forced 
to pay a higher spread on their bonds, suggesting that retail investors started to pay more attention to 
this solvency indicator – which is in line with recent findings by Accornero and Moscatelli (2018).17 
Some researchers (e.g., Haldane, 2012) point out that the business of the largest banks is often 
tilted to trading, investment banking and other market related activities, so that it turns out to be less 
transparent, especially after the blast of the financial crisis. Therefore, the greater risk perceived by 
investors, which translates into a greater spread, could be due to the complexity and opacity of these 
banks rather than to the change in legislation. Even though the two effects (complexity and regulation) 
could coexist, we believe plausible to assert that the complexity effect is since long priced by the 
market, and that no particular increase in the level of complexity has emerged since 2016. Therefore, 
the post 2016 effect can be credibly attributable to the new regulatory framework. Please also note 
that, having considered in our regression model both variables that are proxies of the business models 
and fixed effects, we are implicitly controlling for the different complexity levels at each bank. 
 
5. Additional analyses 
In this Section we present further sets of robustness tests. Most tables referred to in this section are 
found in the Online Appendix. 
 
5.1 Anticipation effect 
Some researchers (see, for instance, Schäfer et al., 2016) highlight that a new legislation could 
produce an effect on the market also before its entry into force, more precisely when decisive 
resolutory actions are taken by preluding a credible implementation of the new rules. This is what 
                                               
16 Although not reported, the coefficients of the interactions of Post2016 with TBTF and TBTF2 are both 
positive and statistically significant.  
17 After the introduction of the bail-in framework, many Italian banks increased the marketing and advertising 
communication about this indicator, which little by little became of common knowledge also for retail investors. 
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happened in Italy at the end of 2015 when a quasi bail-in was implemented to 4 small regionally 
chartered banks. This event represents a unique opportunity to test whether such cases of default could 
have improved investors’ awareness about the negative consequences of futures bail-ins, possibly 
leading them to be more careful about their investment decisions. Therefore, we rerun our entire 
analysis utilizing a dummy equal to one for bonds issued after November 16th 2015, namely when the 
Italian Government published the Law 180/2015 aimed at exerting a burden sharing approach to 
resolve the aforementioned 4 small banks. Our main results – reported in Table OA1 in the Online 
Appendix – do not change appreciably, thus supporting the idea that the market actually started to 
properly price bonds even before the scheduled entry into force of the new bail-in regime. 
 
5.2 Endogeneity issues 
One potential concern that might arise from our study is that the observed increase in the spread could 
be due to an overall increase of banks’ riskiness, rather than to an actual increased perception of bail-
in occurrences. While we believe that by comparing bail-inable to non-bail-inable bonds we are 
mainly capturing the effect of the regulatory change, we cannot rule out this alternative explanation. 
Therefore, we address this issue in a variety of ways. 
First of all, our main regression model adds bank fixed effects that control for bank specific, time-
invariant characteristics that account for other unobserved features that might affect our results. Our 
within bank analysis mitigates the possibility that sources of distress at the bank level could drive our 
results. In a more refined version of our model we also include bank-year fixed effects, which allow to 
control for bank specific, time-variant characteristics, and our main results hold. 
Second, to further reduce this concern, we exclude those banks in the sample that experienced 
severe problems during the observed period. Specifically, the ECB required Banca Carige to boost its 
total capital, which deteriorated over the years as a consequence of the unresolved problem of high 
NPLs. Veneto Banca, instead, was orderly liquidated, in 2017, by the National Resolution Authority 
(Banca d’Italia) after serious undercapitalization problems came out in 2015. Therefore, in order to 
alleviate the concern that the observed increase in Spread is led by the relatively high riskiness of 
these few banks in our sample, we decide to run again our estimates by excluding Banca Carige, as 
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well as Veneto Banca and its controlled BancApulia. Table OA2 in the Online Appendix reports the 
results arising from the analysis conducted on such a sub-sample. Overall, this modification broadly 
corroborates our conclusions.18 
Third, following Schäfer et al. (2016) and Giuliana (2018), we show that the spread between bail-
inable and non-bail-inable bonds reacts also to events that do not produce a significant increase in 
banks’ risk such as, for instance, the events linked to the legislative process of the BRRD. More 
specifically, we repeat our tests by employing a dummy, labelled ‘Post 2014’, that equals one when a 
bond was issued after 15th April 2014 – that is the date when (according to Schäfer et al., 2016) the EU 
Parliament backed Commission’s proposal on the Single Resolution Mechanism. Table OA3 in the 
Online Appendix displays the results of such a test. The results are in line with our main findings in 
Table 3, and are robust to a variety of subsamples. Indeed, regressions are run on the entire sample 
(see Column 1); on a sample that excludes the bonds issued during the bail-in era (i.e., 2016) (see 
Column 2) in order to avoid concerns related to the fact that there was an increase of generic risk 
among banks; and on a sample that only includes bond issuances made one year before and one year 
after 15th April 2014 (i.e., from April 2013 to April 2015) (see Column 3). Overall, our evidence 
corroborates the idea that the shock on the yield spread is not necessarily the consequence of a 
generalized increase of banks risk. 
 
5.3 Other robustness tests 
Another possible issue that might affect our main analyses is that not all the banks in our sample 
issued non-bail-inable bonds. Hence, one might wonder whether the observed increase in the Spread 
between bail-inable and non-bail-inable bonds is driven by the securities issued from those banks that 
have not issued non-bail-inable bonds across the period. To address this concern, we decide to run 
again our models by including only the observations related to the intermediaries that have issued at 
least one non-bail-inable bond over our sample period. This leads us to a sample of 991 bonds issued 
by 11 banks. Results from this sub-sample are reported in Table OA4 in the Online Appendix and 
confirm our main findings.  
                                               
18 The Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena has not issued any fixed-rate bond after the entry into force of the 
BRRD, therefore it is  not in our sample. 
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Moreover, because two banking groups in our sample (i.e., UBI Banca, and Crédit Agricole 
Cariparma) have issued a significantly high number of bonds compared to the rest of the banks in the 
sample (see Table A1 in the Appendix), one could argue that our results are driven by the intrinsic 
characteristics of the two aforementioned issuers. To rule out this possibility, we run again our 
regression model (1) on a sample that excludes the observations related to UBI Banca and Crédit 
Agricole Cariparma. Results from this sub-sample are reported in Table OA5 and confirm our main 
findings. 
Finally, we examine how the main results are affected by the choice of the regressors by employing 
alternative proxies for the bank characteristics as included in the BANK VAR vector. More 
specifically, we use a dummy that tracks if a bank is listed (instead of the logarithm of total assets),19 
“Total Capital Ratio” (in lieu of “TIER 1”), ROAE (rather than ROAA), “Liquid assets over total 
deposits and borrowings” (instead of “Liquid assets over customer deposits and short term funding”), 
“Net charge off over average gross loans” (as opposed to the NPL ratio), as alternative proxies for the 
bank size, capitalization, profitability, liquidity, and credit quality, respectively. Furthermore, we add 
the “Cost-to-income ratio” as a measure of the bank’s efficiency. Table OA6 in the Online Appendix 
reports the results from this robustness check, which widely confirms our findings. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The Global Financial Crisis started in 2007 represented a big challenge for regulators around the 
world. Large amount of taxpayers’ money was utilized to resolve troubled banks in order to limit the 
negative spillovers that eventual bank defaults would have generated to interconnected financial 
systems. In light of this, European policy makers decided to agree, as proposed by the FSB, on a 
“revolutionary” change about how to resolve stressed banks. That is why in May 2014 the European 
Legislative Bodies adopted the BRRD, which led to a deep change from a bailout regime to an 
“internal” way of rescuing banks – so-called bail-in. In essence, this radical switch in regulation aimed 
at transferring the bank risk from taxpayers to the banks’ shareholders and unsecured bondholders. 
                                               
19 Because the Bank FE absorb the ‘Listed bank’ variable – since this is constant over our sample period –, we 
first run our model without Bank FE (Column 1); whereas from Column 2 onwards we use ‘Bank Size’ – 
measured as Log of Total Assets – in order to control for unobserved bank heterogeneity.  
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Because of this increased risk, holders of bail-inable liabilities are expected to ask, ceteris paribus, for 
higher returns compared to holders of liabilities that are excluded from the bail-in mechanism.  
Therefore, in this paper we assess the effect of the new rules on the cost paid by Italian banks when 
issuing bonds, by comparing bonds that are subject to the new regulatory framework compared to 
bonds that are specifically excluded. To test this, we rely on a unique dataset of 1,798 fixed-rate senior 
bonds offered by a sample of 28 Italian banks during the years 2013–2016. The Italian market is a 
good laboratory for testing our hypothesis for several reasons. Italian banks are quite dependent on 
bonds as a form of funding, compared to banks in other European countries; also, the portion of bank 
bonds in Italian retail investors’ portfolios is rather greater than the average of developed countries. 
Second, Italian banks mainly place their bonds directly (i.e., OTC) to their unsophisticated customers, 
giving rise to obvious conflicts of interest, which makes even more important the analysis of the 
effectiveness of the new regulation.  Third, the National Resolution Authority (i.e., the Bank of Italy) 
applied a quasi bail-in to 4 small banks in November 2015, a few weeks before the official 
implementation of the new bail-in framework. Notably, although those 4 regionally chartered banks 
accounted for less than 2% of the Italian banking market, the news of their quasi bail-in became the 
hot topic in the news for a while, which could have enhanced investors’ awareness about the negative 
consequences of bail-ins on their savings and investments.  
Overall, we find that Italian banks experience, on average, a higher bond funding cost upon the 
introduction of the new regulatory framework. Indeed, while controlling for bond and bank 
characteristics, as well as bank fixed effects and bank-time fixed effects, our findings reveal that – 
since the entry into force of the BRRD – the average cost borne by the issuing banks increases 
compared to the cost borne by the Government when issuing bonds with similar maturities. 
Consistent with the existing literature, we observe that banks characterized by lower ratings, 
profitability, capitalization, and higher liquidity were forced to pay higher spreads to place their bonds 
with the new bail-in regime. Additional analyses also highlight that such an effect significantly 
emerged right after the decision of the Italian Resolution Authority to resolve 4 small banks in 
November 2015 by exerting a so-called burden sharing to some of those banks bondholders. This 
confirms the existence of a bail-in effect on the cost of funding borne by the banks through the 
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issuance of bonds. Moreover, we confirm the robustness of our findings by conducting several tests in 
Section 5. 
Overall, our main results offer interesting policy implications because, as prescribed by the new 
legislation, Authorities should also count on market discipline to improve their prudential supervision. 
Higher risk sensitivity, indeed, is especially needed in countries like Italy where, historically, market 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the bond characteristics (BOND VAR vector) 
This table presents summary statistics of the bonds characteristics. ‘Spread’ is the difference between the bond 
yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Maturity’ is the time to 
maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Amount issued’ represents the total fund raised via the bond 
issuance. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Panel A – Entire period (2013-2016) 
  N Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Spread (%) 1,798 0.579 0.498 0.739 -3.126 8.151 
Maturity 1,798 3.887 3.000 2.104 1.500 25.500 
Amount issued (millions of Euro) 1,798 53.738 10.000 156.961 0.008 1,500.000 
Listed 1,798 0.188 0.000 0.391 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B – Pre and post 2016 
  N Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Spread (%)       
Pre 1,586 0.563 0.487 0.734 -3.126 8.151 
Post 2016 212 0.701 0.626 0.772 -1.259 5.118 
Maturity       
Pre 1,586 3.840 3.000 1.982 1.500 20.000 
Post 2016 212 4.236 3.000 2.838 2.000 25.500 
Amount issued (millions of Euro)       
Pre 1,586 52.634 10.431 153.613 0.008 1,500.000 
Post 2016 212 62.001 9.567 180.236 0.010 1,250.000 
Listed       
Pre 1,586 0.186 0.000 0.389 0.000 1.000 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the bank characteristics (BANK VAR vector) 
This table presents summary statistics of the banks characteristics. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates 
numerical values to the mean of the ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher 
values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘Tier1 ratio’ is the ratio of Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets. ‘ROAA’ is the return on average assets. ‘Liquid assets ratio’ is the ratio of 
liquid assets over the sum of customer deposits and short-term funding. ‘NPL ratio’ is the ratio of non-
performing loans over the total amount of outstanding credit. 
 
 N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
Bank rating 112 12.716 12.000 3.739 7.000 18.000 
Bank size 112 16.894 17.354 1.838 13.570 20.556 
Tier 1 ratio (%) 112 11.462 11.200 3.276 6.560 24.303 
ROAA (%) 112 -0.107 0.131 0.734 -2.742 0.865 
Liquid assets ratio (%) 112 12.521 9.520 9.020 1.654 40.342 




Table 3: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank 
size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘TBTF’ (‘TBTF2’) is a dummy equal to one if the total assets of the 
issuing bank are higher than the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year. Columns 1–7 
include year fixed effects. Columns 3–5 include bank fixed effects. Column 8 includes bank*year fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                 
Post 2016 0.479*** 0.484*** 0.544*** 0.538*** 0.534*** 0.489*** 0.498***  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)  
Non-bailinable -0.662*** -0.632*** -0.612*** -0.613*** -0.618*** -0.615*** -0.613*** -0.548*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable  -0.240** -0.223** -0.218** -0.219** -0.208** -0.205* -0.116** 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) 
Size -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.082*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) 
Listed 0.071* 0.070* 0.084 0.082 0.086 0.101** 0.096** 0.066 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.316*** -0.319*** -0.318*** -0.357*** -0.352*** -0.313*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.037) 
Bank rating    0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034***  
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)  
Bank size     -0.340**    
     (0.15)    
TBTF      -0.122***   
      (0.034)   
TBTF2       -0.064*  
       (0.04)  
Constant 0.949*** 0.948*** 0.630*** 0.385 6.244 0.432*** 0.473*** 1.042*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24) (4.30) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
         
Observations 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 
No. Of Banks 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.52 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 




Table 4: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Interactions with bank characteristics 
This table reports regression results related to model (2). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank 
size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘Tier1 ratio’ is the ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets. 
‘ROAA’ is the return on average assets. ‘Liquid assets ratio’ is the ratio of liquid assets over the sum of 
customer deposits and short-term funding. ‘NPL ratio’ is the ratio of non-performing loans over the total amount 
of outstanding credit. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Post 2016 0.372*** 0.545*** 0.407** 0.310* 0.740*** 0.733*** 0.670*** 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
Non-bailinable -0.575*** -0.590*** -0.590*** -0.586*** -0.612*** -0.600*** -0.599*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable -0.145* -0.159* -0.157* -0.156* -0.149* -0.163* -0.161* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.080*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Listed 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.077 0.085 0.084 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.308*** -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.312*** -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.317*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bank rating 0.059** 0.037* 0.036* 0.043* 0.042* 0.039* 0.040* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank size -0.078* -0.170** -0.180** -0.155** -0.152** -0.159** -0.141* 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Tier1 ratio -0.020 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROAA 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.004 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Liquid asset ratio 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NPL ratio 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank rating x Post 2016  0.059*** 0.056*** 0.070** 0.057** 0.049** 0.046** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Bank size x Post 2016   0.067* 0.060** 0.064* 0.058* 0.056* 
   (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Tier1 ratio x Post 2016    -0.034** -0.029* -0.030* -0.028* 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROAA x Post 2016     -0.796*** -0.763*** -0.754*** 
     (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Liquid asset ratio x Post 2016      0.014* 0.014* 
      (0.01) (0.01) 
NPL ratio x Post 2016       0.006 
       (0.01) 
Constant 1.637 3.862 4.113 3.692 -0.208 -0.764 -1.612 
 (4.22) (4.30) (4.54) (4.59) (4.72) (4.67) (4.78) 
        
Observations 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 
No. of Banks 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table A1: List of the sampled banks and related characteristics as of December 2016 
This table reports the names of the sampled banks (first column), along with the corresponding number of bonds issued (second column). The third column provides each 
bank’s total assets in thousands of Euro as of December 2016 (last observed year in our sample). Main owner’s name and related share held are reported in the fourth and fifth 
columns, respectively. Column six shows if a bank is listed in a stock exchange, while column seven provides information about the banks’ type. The eighth column provides 
the total number of a bank’s branches, whereas the ninth column reports whether a bank has branches abroad. Finally, the Authority in charge of each bank’s supervision – 
either European Central Bank (ECB) or Bank of Italy – is reported in the last column. 
Bank Name No. of bonds 
issued, by bank 
Total Assets 
th EUR 
Main owner  
Main owner (% 
of shares held) 







UniCredit SpA 17 859,532,774 Capital Research and Management Company 6.73% Yes Commercial 4,778 Yes ECB 
Intesa Sanpaolo 57 725,100,000 Compagnia San Paolo 9.34% Yes Commercial 5,843 Yes ECB 
Banco Popolare 62 117,411,003 None  Yes Commercial 2,320  ECB 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca 320 112,383,917 Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cuneo 5.91% Yes Commercial 1,843  ECB 
Mediobanca SpA 6 69,818,605 Unicredit SpA 8.46% Yes Commercial 222 Yes ECB 
BPER Banca S.P.A. 126 64,960,024 UnipolSai Assicurazioni spa 5.01% Yes Commercial 1,219  ECB 
Credit Agricole Cariparma SpA 269 52,992,004 Credit Agricole 76.50%  Commercial 612  ECB 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 48 51,131,039 None  Yes Commercial 2,320  ECB 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Società Cooperativa per Azioni 73 37,196,325 None  Yes Commercial – Cooperative 363 Yes ECB 
Veneto Banca scpa 77 28,078,254 None   Commercial 480 Yes ECB 
Banca Carige SpA 17 26,111,004 Malacalza Investmenti Srl 17.58% Yes Commercial 529  ECB 
Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese 92 25,469,459 None  Yes Commercial 412  Bank of Italy 
Cassa di risparmio di Asti SpA 58 12,845,257 Fondazione CR Asti 37.82%  Commercial 245  Bank of Italy 
Unipol Banca Spa 84 12,434,175 Unipol Group 42.25% Yes Commercial 263  Bank of Italy 
Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA-Banco Desio 105 12,365,903 Brianza Unione 52.92% Yes Commercial 265  Bank of Italy 
Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige Spa-Suedtiroler Volksbank 53 9,316,086 None   Commercial 176  Bank of Italy 
Cassa di Risparmio di Ravenna SpA 11 6,890,625 Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Ravenna 49.40%  Commercial 86  Bank of Italy 
Banca Agricola Popolare di Ragusa SCARL 42 4,580,833 None   Commercial – Cooperative 93  Bank of Italy 
Banca Valsabbina Societa cooperativa per azioni 35 4,405,435 None   Commercial – Cooperative 70  Bank of Italy 
Banca Popolare di Cividale Societa Cooperativa per azioni 4 4,271,405 None   Commercial – Cooperative 67  Bank of Italy 
BancApulia SpA 44 4,237,424 Veneto Banca 70.41%  Commercial 85  ECB 
Banca Popolare di Puglia e Basilicata 8 4,126,123 None   Commercial – Cooperative 117  Bank of Italy 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Carate Brianza 20 2,662,857 None   Commercial – Cooperative 30  Bank of Italy 
Banca di credito popolare SCRL 40 2,442,549 None   Commercial – Cooperative 67  Bank of Italy 
Banca Popolare del Lazio 23 2,272,856 None   Commercial – Cooperative 59  Bank of Italy 
Banca Popolare Sant'Angelo 79 1,041,636 None   Commercial – Cooperative 29  Bank of Italy 
Banca S. Biagio del Veneto Orientale di Cesarolo e Fossalta 
di Portogruaro - Banca di Credito Cooperativo 18 935,173 None 
  Commercial – Cooperative 17  Bank of Italy 
Banco di Credito P. Azzoaglio SpA 10 927,657 Azzoaglio family N.A.  Commercial 19  Bank of Italy 




• The banks are listed in the table according to their size – from the largest to the smallest. 
• When the fourth column reports “None”, it means that the bank does not have a majority shareholder – which is mostly the case of cooperative banks. 
• When the fifth column reports “N.A.”, it means that the share (in %) owned by the main owner is not available. 
• BancApulia appears to be subject to the supervision of the ECB as its main owner was Veneto Banca. 
• Banca Popolare dell’Alto Adige Spa-Suedtiroler Volksbank became a joint-stock company in 2016; however, no majority shareholder is found as the bank is a publicly 




Table A2: Correlation matrix 
This table shows the correlations matrix related to the regressors employed in our analyses. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from the 
scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a 
dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-up structure, and 
zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher 
values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘Tier1 ratio’ is the ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets. ‘ROAA’ is the return on 
average assets. ‘Liquid assets ratio’ is the ratio of liquid assets over the sum of customer deposits and short-term funding. ‘NPL ratio’ is the ratio of non-performing loans over 
the total amount of outstanding credit. 
 
 Non-bailinable Size Maturity Listed Step-up Bank rating Bank size Tier1 ratio ROAA Liquid asset ratio NPL ratio 
Non-bailinable 1           
Size 0.343 1          
Maturity 0.312 0.029 1         
Listed 0.300 0.242 0.222 1        
Step-up -0.086 0.091 0.034 0.080 1       
Bank rating -0.084 -0.217 -0.026 -0.163 -0.097 1      
Bank size 0.164 0.427 0.033 0.141 0.047 -0.698 1     
Tier1 ratio 0.014 -0.083 0.007 -0.093 0.010 0.221 -0.217 1    
ROAA 0.019 -0.102 0.133 -0.075 0.072 -0.017 -0.119 0.262 1   
Liquid asset ratio 0.166 0.209 0.121 0.141 -0.034 -0.197 0.319 0.082 -0.020 1  









Table OA1: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Anticipation effect (burden sharing applied to 
four banks – November 2015) 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2015’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 16th 
November 2015, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded 
from the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is 
the time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed 
in a regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a 
step-up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of 
the ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. 
‘Bank size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘TBTF’ (‘TBTF2’) is a dummy equal to one if the total assets 
of the issuing bank are higher than the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Columns 2–4 include bank fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Post 2015 0.152* 0.135** 0.140** 0.138** 0.181** 0.167**  
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-bailinable -0.662*** -0.633*** -0.634*** -0.637*** -0.645*** -0.646***  
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Post 2015xNon-bailinable 
 
-0.108** -0.090* -0.110* -0.124* -0.091*   
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
Size -0.024*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.103*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.104*** -0.104***  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed 0.070* 0.083 0.080 0.084 0.101** 0.096**  
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Step-up -0.377*** -0.313*** -0.317*** -0.316*** -0.356*** -0.350***  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank rating 
  
0.037*** 0.022** 0.033*** 0.034***    
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Bank size 
   
-0.332* 
  




    
-0.123*** 
 




     
-0.041**       
(0.02) 
Constant 0.950*** 0.630*** 0.355 6.076 0.434*** 0.474***  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.24) (4.29) (0.10) (0.11)        
Observations 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 
No. of Banks 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table OA2: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Subsample excluding Banca Carige, Veneto 
Banca, and BancApulia 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank 
size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘TBTF’ (‘TBTF2’) is a dummy equal to one if the total assets of the 
issuing bank are higher than the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Columns 3–5 include bank fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Post 2016 0.469*** 0.474*** 0.476*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.479*** 0.502*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Non-bailinable -0.610*** -0.581*** -0.593*** -0.594*** -0.593*** -0.577*** -0.516*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable  -0.131** -0.148** -0.145** -0.145** -0.135* -0.147** 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Size -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.027*** -0.021*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed 0.064* 0.064 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.084** 0.035 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Step-up -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.249*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.284*** -0.267*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank rating    0.013*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank size     -0.139***   
     (0.03)   
TBTF      -0.120***  
      (0.03)  
TBTF2       -0.165*** 
       (0.04) 
Constant 0.968*** 0.967*** 0.679*** 0.538** -0.136 0.603*** 0.759*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.22) (4.31) (0.10) (0.10) 
        
Observations 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 
No. of Banks 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.29 0.30 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table OA3: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Anticipation effect (EU approval of the proposal 
to establish uniform rules for the resolution of banks, April 2014) 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016 
in Column 1; January 2013–December 2015 in Column 2; April 2013–April 2015 in Column 3. The dependent 
variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign bonds with 
corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2014’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 15th April 2014, 
and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from the scope of the 
bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the time to maturity, 
in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a regulated stock 
exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-up structure, and 
zero otherwise. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. 
  
FULL SAMPLE 2013-2015 4/2013-4/2015  
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Post 2014 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.170***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Non-bailinable -0.432*** -0.453*** -0.493***  
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) 
Post 2014xNon-bailinable -0.406*** -0.401** -0.378**  
(0.14) (0.16) (0.18) 
Size 0.004 0.003 -0.007  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.081*** -0.076*** -0.069***  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Listed 0.085 0.070 0.092  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.326*** -0.361*** -0.371***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.581*** 0.593*** 0.676***  
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13)  
      
Observations 1,798 1,586 1,207 
No. of banks 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.43 0.46 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 







Table OA4: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Subsample excluding the banks that did not issue 
covered bonds 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank 
size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘TBTF’ (‘TBTF2’) is a dummy equal to one if the total assets of the 
issuing bank are higher than the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Columns 3–5 include bank fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Post 2016 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.193*** 0.215*** 0.193*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Non-bailinable -0.468*** -0.473*** -0.504*** -0.504*** -0.501*** -0.454*** -0.520*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable  -0.108* -0.096* -0.10* -0.077* -0.078* -0.103* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Size -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.029*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.085*** -0.083*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Listed 0.035 0.035 0.123 0.123 0.121 0.015 0.055 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.264*** -0.265*** -0.264*** -0.263*** -0.287*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Bank rating    0.037*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank size     -0.091***   
     (0.03)   
TBTF      -0.131***  
      (0.05)  
TBTF2       -0.276*** 
       (0.09) 
Constant 0.888*** 0.889*** 0.937*** 0.855*** -2.832 0.698*** 0.514*** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (10.06) (0.13) (0.15) 
        
Observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991 
No. of Banks 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table OA5: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Subsample excluding the two major issuers 
This table reports regression results related to model (1). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. ‘Bank 
size’ is the natural logarithm of total assets. ‘TBTF’ (‘TBTF2’) is a dummy equal to one if the total assets of the 
issuing bank are higher than the average (75th percentile) total assets of the sample in a given year. Columns 1–7 
include year fixed effects. Columns 3–5 include bank fixed effects. Column 8 includes bank*year fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                 
Post 2016 0.859*** 0.875*** 0.848*** 0.969*** 0.992*** 0.816*** 0.845***  
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  
Non-bailinable -0.631*** -0.565*** -0.582*** -0.576*** -0.583*** -0.511*** -0.579*** -0.499*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable  -0.477*** -0.511*** -0.589*** -0.581*** -0.541*** -0.460*** -0.404*** 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Size 0.009 0.009 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.031*** 0.011 0.036*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.097*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed -0.104** -0.105** 0.013 0.019 0.025 -0.047 -0.058 0.031 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.266*** -0.265*** -0.267*** -0.245*** -0.236*** -0.263*** -0.275*** -0.237*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Bank rating    0.140*** 0.155*** 0.016** 0.016**  
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)  
Bank size     -0.839***    
     (0.27)    
TBTF      -0.282***   
      (0.04)   
TBTF2       0.150***  
       (0.04)  
Constant 0.752*** 0.748*** 0.305** 1.995*** 16.105*** 0.512*** 0.526*** 0.767*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.44) (4.52) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
         
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 
No. of Banks 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.36 0.35 0.61 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 








Table OA6: Bail-in regime and the spread at the issuing date – Interactions with alternative proxies of the bank 
characteristics 
This table reports regression results related to model (2). The estimation period is January 2013–December 2016. 
The dependent variable is the spread between the bond yield at issuance and the yield offered by sovereign 
bonds with corresponding maturity. ‘Post 2016’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond was issued after 1st 
January 2016, and zero otherwise. ‘Non-bailinable’ is a dummy that equals one when a bond is excluded from 
the scope of the bail-in tool, and zero otherwise. ‘Size’ is the logarithm of the amount issued. ‘Maturity’ is the 
time to maturity, in years, measured at the issuing date. ‘Listed’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond is listed in a 
regulated stock exchange or MTF, and zero otherwise. ‘Step-up’ is a dummy equal to one if the bond has a step-
up structure, and zero otherwise. ‘Bank rating’ is a variable that associates numerical values to the mean of the 
ratings assigned (to each issuance) by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, with higher values denoting greater risk. 
‘Listed bank’ is a dummy equal to one if the bank is listed in a regulated stock exchange. ‘Bank size’ is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ‘Total capital ratio’ is the ratio of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital over risk-weighted 
assets. ‘ROAE’ is the return on average equity. ‘Liquid assets to tot. D&B’ is the ratio of liquid assets over the 
sum of depositors’ and borrowers’ funds. ‘NCO to average gross loans’ is the ratio of net charges off over gross 
loans. ‘Cost to income’ is the ratio of the costs of running the bank over the bank’s income. Regressions in 
columns 2–7 include bank fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, clustered at the bank level, appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
               
Post 2016 0.467*** 0.957* 1.375** 1.897** 1.635** 1.732** 1.737** 
 (0.08) (0.54) (0.70) (0.90) (0.82) (0.83) (0.82) 
Non-bailinable -0.610*** -0.620*** -0.613*** -0.637*** -0.627*** -0.622*** -0.631*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Post 2016xNon-bailinable -0.223** -0.182* -0.178* -0.169* -0.168* -0.166* -0.167* 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Size -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Maturity -0.095*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.080*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Listed 0.104** 0.074 0.072 0.083 0.087 0.081 0.081 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Step-up -0.342*** -0.315*** -0.316*** -0.321*** -0.319*** -0.317*** -0.312*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bank rating 0.017*** 0.017* 0.025** 0.017* 0.016* 0.019** 0.016* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed bank -0.247***       
 (0.04)       
Listed bank x Post2016 0.149*       
 (0.08)       
Bank size  -0.503* -0.480* -0.217* -0.206* -0.210* -0.318 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.26) 
Total capital ratio -0.017 -0.020 -0.018 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.017 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROAE -0.016*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liquid assets to tot. D&B 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.015 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NCO to average gross loans 0.074*** 0.071** 0.094* 0.052* 0.050* 0.056* 0.079* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Bank rating x Post 2016  0.048** 0.075** 0.027* 0.030* 0.027* 0.027* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank size x Post 2016  0.074* 0.074* 0.082* 0.072* 0.074* 0.065* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Total capital ratio x Post 2016   -0.059* -0.032** -0.028* -0.026* -0.025* 
   (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROAE x Post 2016    -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.075*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Liquid assets to tot. D&B x Post 2016     0.024** 0.022** 0.018* 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NCO to average gross loans x Post 2016      0.125* 0.124* 
      (0.07) (0.07) 
Cost to income       0.004 
       (0.00) 
Cost to income x Post 2016       -0.020*** 
       (0.01) 
Constant 0.828*** 9.488** 9.207** 4.472 4.333 3.611 5.626 
 (0.12) (4.53) (4.38) (4.50) (4.47) (4.56) (4.54) 
        
Observations 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 
No. of Banks 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
